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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 44039 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) JEROME COUNTY NO. CR 2015-1440 
v.     ) 
     ) 
JUDITH SCANTLIN,  ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 After Judith Scantlin pled guilty to two counts of grand theft, the district court 
imposed an aggregate sentence of fourteen years, with two years fixed. Ms. Scantlin 
then moved for reconsideration of her sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 
35”), which the district court denied. Ms. Scantlin appeals, contending the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and by denying her Rule 35 
motion.  
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 From 2005 to 2013, Ms. Scantlin was employed as a bookkeeper and secretary 
for A&G Irrigation (“A&G”) in Jerome, Idaho. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 
pp.4, 7.) A&G had loaned Ms. Scantlin money in the past, but, in 2011, Ms. Scantlin 
began writing checks to herself without A&G’s permission. (PSI, pp.4–6, 8.) 
According to the Criminal Complaint, Ms. Scantlin forged 37 checks from 2011 to 2013, 
amounting to $127,000. (R., pp.8–28.) Based on these forged checks, the State alleged 
Ms. Scantlin committed 37 counts of grand theft, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1) and 
-2407(1)(b)(1). (R., pp.8–28.)  
 Ms. Scantlin waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound her over to 
district court. (R., pp.82–83, 115.) The State filed an Information charging Ms. Scantlin 
with 37 counts of grand theft. (R., pp.88–107.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Ms. Scantlin pled guilty to two counts of grand theft. (Tr. Vol. I,2 p.3, L.17–p.4, L.1, p.11, 
Ls.8–22, p.17, L.5–p.19, L.6; R., pp.131–32.) The State agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charges. (Tr. Vol. I, p.3, Ls.18–20, p.11, Ls.8–14; R., p.152 (motion and order of 
dismissal).)  
 At sentencing, the State recommended the district court retain jurisdiction, with 
an underlying aggregate sentence of ten years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, 
Ls.12–18, p.6, Ls.4–7.) Ms. Scantlin requested probation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.11–12, 
                                            
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 84-page electronic document containing most of the 
confidential exhibits in this case. Two other confidential exhibits (letters of support) were 
submitted separately from the PSI and are cited herein as “Letter from D. Hash” or 
“Letter from G. Henderson.”  
2 There are two transcripts in the record on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, refers to 
the entry of plea hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, refers to the sentencing 
hearing.  
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p.11, Ls.7–9.) The district court sentenced Ms. Scantlin to fourteen years, with two 
years fixed, for each count of grand theft, to be served concurrently. (Tr. Vol. II, p.21, 
L.21–p.22, L.5.) The district court declined to retain jurisdiction or place Ms. Scantlin on 
probation. (Tr. Vol. II, p.22, Ls.5–7.) In addition, the district court did not order restitution 
because A&G already obtained a civil judgment against Ms. Scantlin. (Tr. Vol. II, p.22, 
Ls.8–15.) Ms. Scantlin filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s judgment 
of conviction. (R., pp.145–50, 153–55.) 
 After sentencing, Ms. Scantlin filed a timely motion for reconsideration of her 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35 and attached four new letters of support. (Aug. R., pp.1–
8.) The district court denied her motion, reasoning the information submitted with the 
Rule 35 motion was not “truly ‘new information.’” (Aug. R., pp.9–11.) 
  
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified aggregate 
sentence of fourteen years, with two years fixed, upon Ms. Scantlin, following her 
guilty plea to two counts of grand theft? 
 







The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Aggregate 
Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Scantlin, Following Her 
Guilty Plea To Two Counts Of Grand Theft 
 
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
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imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. 
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Scantlin’s 
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a) (maximum 
of fourteen years imprisonment). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was 
unreasonable, Ms. Scantlin “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing 
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 
457, 460 (2002).  
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be 
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)). 
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public; (3) 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. 
 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to 
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 
122, 132 (2011).  
“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial 
court to gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and 
suitability for probation.” State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). 
“[P]robation is the ultimate objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id. 
at 677. The district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Id. Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing 
5 
alternatives, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. 
Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990). “The denial of probation will not be 
deemed an abuse of discretion if the decision is consistent with the criteria articulated in 
I.C. § 19-2521.” State v. Hostetler, 124 Idaho 191, 192 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Ms. Scantlin asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends 
the district court should have placed her on probation, retained jurisdiction, or imposed 
a lesser sentence in light of the mitigating factors, including her gainful employment, 
letters of support, mental health issues, and acceptance of responsibility and remorse 
for the crime. 
 Despite the instant offenses, Ms. Scantlin obtained new employment and 
received excellent letters of recommendation from her recent employers. See State v. 
Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118, 289 P.2d 315, 317 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment 
as a mitigating factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (Ct. App. 
1982) (employment and desire to advance within company were mitigating 
circumstances). Ms. Scantlin worked for Gem State Staffing for one year after her 
employment with A&G. (PSI, p.16.) Her supervisor at Gem State Staffing wrote that 
Ms. Scantlin was honest and forthcoming about her legal issues with A&G. (PSI, p.27.) 
Indeed, her supervisor trusted her with “some very sensitive responsibilities,” including 
payroll. (PSI, p.27.) Her supervisor also explained that Ms. Scantlin was an exceptional 
employee and “a decent and moral person.” (PSI, p.27.) After Gem State Staffing, 
Ms. Scantlin worked for Jerome Cheese Co. in the human resources department from 
January of 2014 until sentencing. (PSI, p.16.) She worked fifty to sixty hours a week. 
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(PSI, p.16.) Ms. Scantlin’s supervisor at Jerome Cheese Co. described her as “a 
dedicated, loyal and extremely hard working employee.” (PSI, p.28.) He stated that she 
was a valuable staff member, a kind and caring person, and a “vital link” in the 
business. (PSI, p.28.) In addition, two of Ms. Scantlin’s co-workers provided reference 
letters. (PSI, p.29; Letter from D. Hash.)  One co-worker explained that Ms. Scantlin 
was trustworthy with confidential information. (PSI, p.29.) Another co-worker stated that 
Ms. Scantlin was a diligent worker and often worked late to get tasks done. (Letter from 
D. Hash.) This co-worker described Ms. Scantlin as trustworthy, reliable, and honest, as 
well as caring, patient, and helpful towards other employees. (Letter from D. Hash.) The 
co-worker believed the instant offenses were completely out of character for 
Ms. Scantlin. (Letter from D. Hash.) Considering Ms. Scantlin’s successful employment 
after the instant offenses, the district court should have sentenced her to a lesser term 
of imprisonment, retained jurisdiction, or placed her on probation.  
In addition, Ms. Scantlin submitted three letters of support and good character.3 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (family support and good character as mitigation); see 
State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district court considered family 
and friend support as mitigating circumstance). These letters described Ms. Scantlin as 
trustworthy, law-abiding, hard-working, dedicated, honest, selfless, and loyal. (PSI, 
pp.30–31; Letter from G. Henderson.) In particular, one character letter described 
Ms. Scantlin’s dedicated and hard-working service on the Foundation Board of 
                                            
3 Ms. Scantlin has not had contact with her parents for years due to her abusive 
childhood, but they also wrote letters for sentencing. (PSI, pp.32–34; Tr. Vol. II, p.8, 
L.22–p.9, L.5.) Ms. Scantlin’s mother was an alcoholic and physically abusive. (PSI, 
pp.13, 64, 80.) 
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St. Benedict’s Family Medical Center. (Letter from G. Henderson.) Ms. Scantlin served 
on the Foundation Board for seven years. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, Ls.16–21.) These letters of 
support stand in mitigation.  
Ms. Scantlin’s mental health and substance abuse issues are also mitigating 
circumstances in favor of a lesser sentence. Ms. Scantlin started drinking alcohol at age 
thirteen. (PSI, p.18.) She overcame her alcohol addiction at the age of thirty-four, after 
she received her sixth driving under the influence conviction. (PSI, p.18.) She has not 
drank alcohol since and appears to have had no issues on probation, other than the 
instant offenses. (PSI, p.18.) Ms. Scantlin also suffers from depression and bulimia. 
(PSI, pp.17–18.) The mental health assessment determined Ms. Scantlin did not need 
mental health services, but Ms. Scantlin’s attorney strongly disagreed with that 
determination. (PSI, p.71, Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.21–p.7, L.7.) Ms. Scantlin reported that she 
was diagnosed with severe depression and had considered suicide. (PSI, pp.17, 76.) 
These mitigating factors were not sufficiently considered by the district court at 
sentencing.  
Finally, Ms. Scantlin accepted responsibility for the crime and felt great remorse 
for her actions. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor 
of mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Ms. Scantlin explained in the 
presentence investigation and at sentencing that she was sincerely sorry for the harm to 
A&G. (PSI, pp.8, 20; Tr. Vol. II, p.11, L.23–p.13, L.2.) Further, Ms. Scantlin’s attorney 
indicated Ms. Scantlin was making monthly payments to A&G. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, L.25–p.8, 
L.9.) Her acceptance of responsibility and remorse support a lesser sentence, including 
a period of retained jurisdiction or probation. 
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The district court abused its discretion at sentencing by failing to give adequate 
weight to the mitigating circumstances in this case. In light of Ms. Scantlin’s gainful 
employment, letters of support, mental health issues, and acceptance of responsibility 
and remorse, the district court should have imposed a lesser sentence, retained 
jurisdiction, or placed Ms. Scantlin on probation. 
   
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Scantlin’s Rule 35 Motion 
 “A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 
(Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must 
“consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the 
reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The Court “conduct[s] an independent 
review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 
(Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence 
under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the 
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to 
reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 
35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
 Here, Ms. Scantlin submitted four new letters of support with her Rule 35 motion. 
(Aug. R., pp.4–8.) Ms. Scantlin’s daughter-in-law wrote that Ms. Scantlin was a 
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thoughtful, caring, and supportive person. (Aug. R., pp.4–5.) A friend of seven years 
explained that Ms. Scantlin was loyal and trustworthy, even though she struggled with 
low self-esteem and was always “down” on herself. (Aug. R., p.6.) Another friend of 
twenty years noted some of the “agonizing events” in Ms. Scantlin’s life and her 
depression. (Aug. R., p.7.) This friend believed Ms. Scantlin was a good role model. 
(Aug. R., p.7.) Finally, Ms. Scantlin’s ex-husband stated that Ms. Scantlin was of “very 
high character” and had good judgment. (Aug. R., p.8.) As explained in her Rule 35 
motion, these letters demonstrated that Ms. Scantlin had struggled with depression for 
many years. (Aug. R., p.2.) These letters also showed that Ms. Scantlin had a strong 
support system to help her succeed on probation. The district court abused its discretion 
by declining to consider these letters in support of Ms. Scantlin’s Rule 35 motion. These 
letters provided additional information to the district court on Ms. Scantlin’s childhood, 
character, and mental and physical health. Based on this additional information, the 




Ms. Scantlin respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it 
deems appropriate (including a period of retained jurisdiction or probation) or remand 
her case for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the district court’s order denying her Rule 35 motion and remand her case 
for further proceedings.   
 DATED this 8th day of August, 2016. 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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